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      英語世界
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      《菊花與戰刀:日本文化的模式》
      發布時間:2017年11月07日     作者:Chenguohua  
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      The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese CultureExcerpt

      《菊花與戰刀:日本文化的模式》(節選)

       

      By Ruth Benedict

      /茹絲·貝訥迪克 譯/陳國華

       

       

      【譯者的話】個人有人格(personality),族群有族格(ethnicitynational character)。對于日本人的族格,捕捉最準確、刻畫最深刻的學者可能是美國文化人類學和民俗學家茹絲·貝訥迪克1Ruth Benedict,18871948)。作為美國人類學創始人博厄斯的嫡傳弟子,貝訥迪克側重研究文化與人格之間的關系,其專著《文化模式》(Patterns of Culture,1934)被譯成14種語言。1944年,她受美國戰爭資訊處(Office of War Information)委托,對日本民族的主要人格特性(leading personality traits)展開研究,以便美國軍方能看透日本軍人的心理并預測其行為2。通過對日本進行遠距離人類學研究(anthropology at a distance),貝訥迪克發現,日本文化和美國文化的主要不同之處在于,美國社會以罪感文化(guilt cultures)為主導,日本社會以恥感文化(shame cultures)為主導,由此可以解釋日本人的許多性格特點。她根據自己的研究結果向美國政府提交的咨詢報告,對羅斯??偨y決定對日作戰采取什么戰略和策略,特別是要不要投原子彈,如何對待日本天皇,戰后如何對日本實施管控等,都產生了重要影響。二戰結束后,貝訥迪克對其研究成果加以補充修改,以《菊花與戰刀》(The Chrysanthemum and the Sword3作為書名,于1946年出版。該書出版后,在美國和日本都引起極大反響,成為文化人類學的一部經典,貝訥迪克也于1947年當選美國人類學協會(American Anthropological Association)主席。

       

      二戰之后,日本政府主要由右翼勢力把持,在對待戰爭罪責問題上,其流氓行徑令人難以理解;近年來在釣魚島爭端中,它表現出的掩耳盜鈴、蠻不講理態度也同樣令人費解。同時,美國與日本戰后的關系似乎也令人難以琢磨,二者之間真的是大哥和小弟之間的單純情誼和軍事同盟關系嗎?重讀這本書,我們可以參透其中的一些奧妙。

       

      貝訥迪克本科是英文,畢業后做過中學英文教師,發表過詩歌,寫過傳記,其著述頗具文采。自黃道琳的譯本《菊花與劍》(臺灣:桂冠圖書公司,1974)出版以來,此書已有20多個中文譯本。筆者參考呂萬和等(1990)、孫志民等(2005)和劉鋒(2007)的譯本,重譯本書第一章的頭7段,糾正之前譯本中的一些錯誤,力圖在一定程度上再現原著的文采,并通過注釋展現翻譯過程。

       

      Chapter 1 Assignment: Japan

       

      [1] The Japanese were the most alien4 enemy the United States had ever fought in an all-out struggle. In no other war with a major foe5 had it been necessary to take into account such exceedingly6 different habits of acting and thinking. Like Czarist Russia before us in 1905,we were fighting a nation fully armed and trained which did not belong to the Western cultural tradition. Conventions of war which Western nations had come to accept as facts of human nature obviously did not exist for the Japanese. It made the war in the Pacific more than a series of landings on island beaches, more than an unsurpassed problem of logistics. It made it a major problem in the nature of the enemy. We had to understand their behavior in order to cope with it7.

       

      第一章 使命:日本

       

      1〕在美國全力以赴與之搏斗過的敵人中,日本人最為異類。在之前與任何一個勁敵的交戰中,我們都不必考慮對方的行事和思維習慣與我們的迥然不同。跟1905年的沙皇俄國一樣,我們現在是在與一個全副武裝、訓練有素、不屬于西方文化傳統的民族作戰。西方民族視為符合人性的那些戰爭常規,對于日本人來說,顯然并不存在。這使得太平洋戰爭不僅是一系列的島嶼搶灘登陸,也不僅是無比艱難的后勤保障,而且還是認識敵人本性的一個大問題。只有了解其行為,才能應對其行為。

       

      [2] The difficulties8 were great. During the past seventy-five years since Japan’s closed doors were opened9, the Japanese have been described in the most fantastic10 series of “but also’s” ever used for any nation of the world. When a serious observer is writing about peoples other than the Japanese11 and says they are unprecedentedly polite12, he is not likely to add, “But also insolent and overbearing.” When he says people of some nation are incomparably rigid13 in their behavior, he does not add, “But also they adapt themselves readily to extreme14 innovations.” When he says a people are submissive, he does not explain too that they are not easily amenable to control from above15. When he says they are loyal and generous, he does not declare, “But also treacherous and spiteful16.” When he says they are genuinely brave, he does not expatiate on their timidity. When he says they act out of concern for others’ opinions, he does not then go on to tell that they have a truly terrifying conscience17. When he describes robot-like discipline18 in their Army, he does not continue by describing the way the soldiers in that Army take the bit in their own teeth even to the point of insubordination. When he describes a people who devote themselves with passion to Western learning, he does not also enlarge on their fervid19 conservatism. When he writes a book on a nation with a popular cult of aestheticism which gives high honor to actors and to artists and lavishes art upon20 the cultivation of chrysanthemums, that book does not ordinarily have to be supplemented by another which is devoted to the cult of the sword and the top prestige21 of the warrior.

       

      2〕這件事困難重重。日本打開其關閉的大門已經75年了,這期間人們一直用一系列的“卻又”來形容日本人,頻率高得出奇,超過用來形容世界上任何其他民族。嚴肅認真的觀察家在描寫其他各民族時,如果說他們彬彬有禮,無以復加,就不大可能又補充說“卻又出言不遜,趾高氣昂”;如果說某一民族的人行為無比僵化,就不會再補充說“卻樂于順應極為大膽的創新”;如果說一個民族性情溫順,就不會又解釋說,他們容易桀驁不馴;如果贊揚他們忠心耿耿,寬厚大度,就不會又宣布,他們“居心叵測、刻薄惡毒”;如果形容他們英勇無畏,就不會繼而侈談他們膽小如鼠;如果說他們一舉一動都顧及他人看法,就不會接著又說,他們的良心實在令人膽寒;如果描寫他們軍紀嚴明,如同機器人一般整齊劃一,就不會繼而又描述士兵們自作主張、自行其是,甚至到了以下犯上的程度;如果講述一個民族如何激情地擁抱西學,就不會繼而又大談他們怎樣狂熱地固守祖制;如果寫一本書,介紹一個國家的民眾如何崇尚唯美主義,給予演員和藝術家崇高榮譽,在菊花栽培上傾注心血,精益求精,就一般不會馬上續寫一本書,專講該國的戰刀崇拜和武士的至尊地位。

       

      [3] All these contradictions, however, are the warp and woof of books on Japan. They are true. Both the sword and the chrysanthemum are a part of the picture. The Japanese are, to the highest degree22, both aggressive and un-aggressive, both militaristic and aesthetic, both insolent and polite, rigid and adaptable, submissive and resentful of being pushed around23, loyal and treacherous, brave and timid, conservative and hospitable to new ways24. They are terribly concerned about what other people will think of their behavior, and they are also overcome by guilt25 when other people know nothing of their misstep. Their soldiers are disciplined to the hilt26 but are also insubordinate27.

       

      3〕然而這些相互矛盾的說法卻成了有關日本問題著作的經線和緯線,且全是真的。戰刀與菊花都是一幅畫面的組成部分。相互矛盾的特性在日本人那里集為一身,達到無以復加的程度:他們既好斗又不好斗,既尚武又唯美,既傲慢又客氣,既僵化又善變,既馴服又執拗,既忠誠又奸詐,既勇敢又怯弱,既守舊又創新。他們十分在意別人對自己行為的看法,但倘若別人對其劣行毫不知情,他們也會情不自禁為非作歹。他們的士兵被訓練得服服帖帖,但也會抗命不遵。

       

      [4] When it became so important for America to understand Japan, these contradictions and many others equally blatant28 could not be waved aside. Crises29 were facing us in quick succession. What would the Japanese do? Was capitulation30 possible without invasion? Should we bomb the Emperor’s palace? What could we expect of Japanese prisoners of war? What should we say in our propaganda to Japanese troops and to the Japanese homeland which could save the lives of Americans and lessen Japanese determination to fight to the last man31? There were violent disagreements32 among those who knew the Japanese best33. When peace came, were the Japanese a people who would require perpetual martial law to keep them in order34? Would our army have to prepare to fight desperate bitter-enders35 in every mountain fastness of Japan36? Would there have to be a revolution in Japan after the order of the French Revolution or the Russian Revolution before37 international peace was possible? Who would lead it? Was the alternative the eradication38 of the Japanese? It made a great deal of difference39 what our judgments were.

       

      4〕了解日本已是美國當務之急,面對日本人的這些矛盾性格以及其他許多同樣顯而易見的特性,我們不能置之不理。關鍵時刻接踵而至。日本人下一步會干什么?能否不進攻日本本土就讓它根據所給條件投降?是否應該轟炸皇宮?從日本戰俘口中可以期待得到什么?在對日軍及其本土進行宣傳時,說些什么才能減少美國士兵的傷亡,瓦解日本頑抗到最后一兵一卒的斗志?在這些問題上,日本問題專家們唇槍舌劍,爭論不休。一旦和平到來,日本這個民族是否需要實行無限期軍事管制才能使他們安分守己?我軍是否得準備在日本的每一個山頭與地堡里拼死抵抗的日軍士兵激戰?是否得在日本爆發一場革命,就像法國革命或俄國革命那樣,國際和平才有可能實現?誰會領導這場革命?如若不然,是不是只好把日本人徹底消滅?我們做出什么判斷,事關重大。

       

      [5] In June, 1944, I was assigned to the study of Japan. I was asked to use all the techniques I could as a cultural anthropologist to spell out what the Japanese were like. During that early summer our great offensive against Japan had just begun to show itself in its true magnitude40. People in the United States were still saying that the war with Japan would last three years, perhaps ten years, more. In Japan they talked of its lasting one hundred years. Americans, they said, had had local victories, but New Guinea and the Solomons were thousands of miles away from their home islands. Their official communiqués had hardly admitted naval defeats and the Japanese people still regarded themselves as victors.

       

       519446月,我受命研究日本,要我利用文化人類學家的所有手段和方法,描繪出日本人的特點。那年夏初,我們對日本進行的大反攻剛剛顯山露水。在美國,人們仍說對日戰爭會持續三年,也許十年,甚至更長。在日本,人們則說這場戰爭會持續一百年。他們說,美國人雖然取得了一些局部勝利,但是新幾內亞和所羅門群島距日本本土有數千英里之遙。他們的官方公報幾乎從不承認其海軍的失敗,日本人民依舊自認為是勝利者。

       

      [6] In June, however, the situation began to change. The second front was opened in Europe and the military priority which the High Command had for two years and a half given to the European theater paid off41. The end of the war against Germany was in sight. And in the Pacific our forces landed on Saipan, a great operation forecasting eventual Japanese defeat. From then on our soldiers were to face the Japanese army at constantly closer quarters. And we knew well, from the fighting in New Guinea, on Guadalcanal, in Burma, on Attu and Tarawa and Biak, that we were pitted against a formidable foe.

       

      6〕到了6月,局勢卻發生了變化,歐洲開辟了第二戰場。兩年半以來,盟軍最高統帥部在軍事上一直把歐洲戰場擺在首位,這一做法收到了成效,對德戰爭的勝利指日可待。在太平洋戰場上,我軍在塞班島登陸,這一重大戰役昭示著日本的最終失敗。此后美軍將會與日軍日益抵近接火。通過在新幾內亞、瓜達爾卡納爾島、緬甸、阿圖島、塔拉瓦島和比亞克島與日軍交戰,我們已經清楚地知道,自己是在跟一個強悍之敵較量。

       

      [7] In June, 1944, therefore, it was important to answer a multitude of questions about our enemy, Japan. Whether the issue was military or diplomatic, whether it was raised by questions of high policy or of leaflets to be dropped behind the Japanese front lines, every insight was important42. In the all-out war Japan was fighting we had to know, not just the aims and motives, of those in power in Tokyo, not just the long history of Japan, not just economic and military statistics; we had to know what their government could count on from the people. We had to try to understand Japanese habits of thought and emotion and the patterns into which these habits fell. We had to know the sanctions43 behind these actions and opinions. We had to put aside for the moment the premises on which we act as Americans44 and to keep ourselves as far as possible from leaping to the easy conclusion that what we would do in a given situation45 was what they would do.

       

      7〕因此,19446月一件重要的事就是,解答有關日本這一敵國的諸多問題。無論是軍事問題還是外交問題,是高層決策提出的問題還是關于空投到日軍后方傳單的問題,每一見解都很重要。在日本發動的這場全面戰爭中,我們要了解的不僅是東京當權者的目的和動機,不僅是日本的悠久歷史,不僅是經濟上和軍事上的統計數據;還包括日本政府指望從人民那里獲得什么樣的支持。我們得了解日本人的思維和情感習慣以及這些習慣形成的模式,了解這些行為和觀點背后的動機。我們得暫時把我們美國人的思維和行事模式放在一邊,盡量避免輕率地下結論,說在特定環境下我們怎么做,日本人也會怎么做。

       

      (選自《英語世界》2014年第3期)

       

      注釋:

       

      1. Ruth的傳統“規范”譯名是“魯思”,但這一譯名男女不分;“露絲”是女名。Benedict的“規范”譯名“貝內迪克特”不如“貝訥迪克”準確。

       

      2. 當時日本軍人的一些行為令美軍大惑不解,例如,美國人若當了俘虜,第一愿望就是讓家人知道自己還活著,同時會盡量保守己方機密;而日本俘虜卻一般不愿讓家人知道自己被俘,但會愿意交代其所掌握的軍事機密。

       

      3. 絕大多數譯者都將Chrysanthemum譯成“菊”,簡潔。在意象上,“花”與“刀”更加對稱。如果這里譯成“菊花”,那么與之對稱的兩個字最好是“戰刀”。

       

      4. 英語里將外星人稱為aliens,這里alien的意思相當于華夏民族所謂“非我族類”,不是“琢磨不透”或“讓人感到費解”,“異特”(孫志民等)的意思是對的,但不如“特異”通順。

       

      5. foeenemy文雅,所以譯文也選用“勁敵”這一比較文雅的詞。

       

      6. 這里是“極為”的意思,可以譯成“迥然”(呂萬和等)。

       

      7. cope with的意思是“應對,對付”,不是“對抗”;cope with it不是“同他們打交道”,而是“應對日本人的行為”。

       

      8. 這里試用“重重”表示原文的復數。

       

      9. 譯成“……已經75年了,這期間”而不是“在自從日本關閉的大門被打開以來的75年間”,是為了避免介詞“在”后面的補語過長。

       

      10. 這里的意思應是“高//多得出奇”,不是“令人極為迷惑”或“極為離奇”。

       

      11. 意思是“日本族之外的其他民族”,但由于有上下文,譯文略去“日本族之外的”,意思也很清楚。

       

      12. 考慮到“彬彬有禮”還沒有把原文的意思充分表達出來,所以后面補了一句“無以復加”。

       

      13. 意思不是“頑固”,而是“僵化;僵硬”。

       

      14. 本義是“極端;激進”;與“創新”搭配,可以譯成“大膽”。

       

      15. 意思是“不容易讓他們服從上級管控”,反過來說也就是“容易桀驁不馴”。

       

      16. treacherous在這里與loyal形成對照,指不忠不義、賣主求榮之類的奸詐行為;spitefulgenerous形成對照,意思應當是“刻薄惡毒”或“充滿惡意”(劉鋒),不是“滿腹怨恨”或“心懷叵測”。

       

      17. 意思不是“真誠的良心”、“確實具有強烈的內在良心”或“強烈的道德準則”,而是“其良心令人膽寒”。

       

      18. 這里的discipline不是在說“訓練”問題,而是在說紀律問題,可以譯成“機器人一樣的紀律”或“機械式的紀律”(劉鋒)。

       

      19. passionateardent是近義詞,表示“狂熱”,本身沒有“頑固”的意思。

       

      20. lavish art upon sth.: 在某方面揮霍技藝就是“傾注心血,精益求精”,也可以譯成“醉心于”(呂萬和等)或“沉湎于”(劉鋒)。

       

      21. 至尊地位是“專講”(devoted to)的對象,不是“崇拜”(cult of)的對象。

       

      22. 意思不是“從很大程度上講”,而是“達到最高程度”。同時,這一短語不單修飾“既好斗又不好斗”,還修飾下面描寫的所有相互矛盾的特性,因此筆者在譯文里增加了“相互矛盾的特性在日本人那里集為一身”,作為下面幾句話的概括。

       

      23. “不愿受人擺布”(呂萬和等)就是“執拗”。

       

      24. “十分歡迎新的方式”簡而言之就是“創新”。ways不一定限于“生活方式”。

       

      25. “被罪惡所征服”或“被自己的罪惡感所壓服”不如“情不自禁為非作歹”意思清楚。

       

      26. discipline有“訓練”的意思,但它指的不是單純的軍事訓練,而是服從命令聽指揮的訓練;to the hilt的意思是“徹底”,“得到了徹底的紀律訓練”就是“已經被訓練得服服帖帖”。

       

      27. “不服從上級”或“抗命不遵”。

       

      28. 意思不是“同樣令人煩躁”或“顯得亂哄哄的”,而是“顯眼”或“顯而易見”。

       

      29. 這里指需要做出重大決策的時刻,即“緊要關頭”或“關鍵時刻”,不是“嚴重的事態”或“危機”。

       

      30. 指根據所達成的協議或所給出的條件投降。

       

      31. 英語里man可以指士兵,與officer相對,因此這里譯成“一兵一卒”。

       

      32. “暴力的意見不合”即“唇槍舌劍”。

       

      33. 即“日本問題專家”,也可譯成“日本通”(呂萬和等)。

       

      34. 這里的意思不是“為了維持秩序”,而是“使他們安分守己/老老實實”。

       

      35. desperate bitter-enders:在這里“絕望的痛苦結局者”即“拼死抵抗的日軍士兵”。

       

      36. fight ... in every mountain fastness of Japan:既然山是日本的,堡壘建在山上,日本士兵躲在堡壘里,為了讓譯文通暢,與其說“與日本的每一個山中要塞里的……進行戰斗”,不如說“在日本的每一個山頭與地堡里……激戰”。

       

      37. 這里的意思不是簡單的“之前”,而是相當于“才”。

       

      38. 徹底消滅(wipe out),即使用原子彈之類大規模殺傷武器所達到的效果。譯成“日本民族只有滅亡”或“日本民族將會滅亡”不如“只有叫日本民族滅亡”意思清楚。

       

      39. 意思不是“肯定是眾說紛紜的”、“分歧極大”或“肯定是千差萬別的”,而是“事關重大”或“結果會大為不同”。

       

      40. 意思不是“展開”,而是“顯現出其真正的規?!?,即“顯山露水”。

       

      41. 意思不是“已無必要”或“現在沒有這種必要了”,而是“得到了回報”或“收到了成效”。

       

      42. 這里的意思不是“必須提出真知灼見”,而是“每一個見解都很重要”。

       

      43. 這里的意思不是“制約力”、“強制力”或“制約因素”,而是指批準某一行動的道理或采取這一行動的動機。

       

      44. 這里的the premises指邏輯學中三段論(syllogism)推理的大前提(major premise)和小前提(minor premise),譯成“美國人采取行動的那些前提”或“自己作為美國人而據以行動的前提”,不如“我們美國人的思維和行事模式”清楚。

       

      45. 意思不是“在那種情況下”,而是“在特定情況下”。

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